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It’s not immediately clear how the term “slur” should be considered; on the one hand,philosophers of language and linguists treat it as it referred to a natural category,just like “proper name” or “factive verb”; on the other hand, the focus on slurs asa class of terms is quite recent, to the extent that many languages have no termto name the class and adopt the English term instead (in Italian1. and French, forexample, scholars talk about “slurs”).Just like any other complete account of slurs, the present theory answers thefollowing questions: what do these terms do? How do they do it? How does thefirst follow from the second? The main claim of this talk is that, unlike what mostscholars hold, slurs are just plain non-loaded terms: they don’t mix a descriptiveneutral content together with an expressive one (like thick terms are taken to do).The difference between a slur and its neutral counterpart - take for example “boche”and “German” - is a matter of metadata or social underpinnings, rather than con-veyed content (truth-conditional or presuppositional or conventionally implicated):in particular, “boche” is the term chosen to refer to German people among Ger-manophobes as an alternative to the standard “German”. When speakers use a slur,they exploit the gricean Maxim of Manner or the levinsonian M -Principle:
When S has said “p” containing marked expression M, and there is anunmarked alternate expression U with the same denotation D whichthe speaker might have employed in the same sentence-frame instead,then where U would have I-implicated the stereotypical or more specificsubset d of D, the marked expression M will implicate the complementof the denotation d, namely d’ of D (Levinson, 1987).
The exploitation of the M-Principle gives raise to ventriloquistic implicatures, thatare characterized as follows: (i) usually non-cancellable; (ii) generally speaker-oriented; (iii) must be alternatives to contextual default.
1See for example what happens in Bianchi (2013).
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To use a slur is to assert one’s affiliation with a group that has a disparagingattitude towards the slur’s referent: the source of the pejorativeness of slurs is theattitude associated to the group who owns them. Scholars who investigated slursusually focused on their abusive use and political effects; but we shouldn’t neglectthat slurs’ primary role is to strengthen a sense of group identity. The mechanismthanks to which slurs convey a derogatory content is entirely pragmatic and hasnothing to do with the meaning of the term itself. Nevertheless, speakers sharethis intuition about slurs as conveying their derogatory content in a conventionalmanner. The present account can assess the issue as follows: a certain groupof speakers adopts a term because they think it answers to certain communicativepurposes of theirs and this coordination gives raise to a convention; but it is a meta-data convention, it doesn’t concern neither the truth-conditional meaning nor theconventionally implicated nor the presuppositional one. The standard view on slursis that “nigger” is conventionally used among English-speakers to refer to blackswhen one wants to convey a contemptuous attitude towards them; the presentproposal, on the contrary, holds that “nigger” is the conventional descriptive wayfor blacks among the participants in a English-speaking discourse where blacks areviewed as with contempt.From this perspective, slurs don’t constitute a natural class: on the contrary, theyare very similar to other terms, such as derogatives based on political orientation(“commie”,“facho”), social status (“pleb”, “plutocrat”), religion (“papist”, “clamhead”),derogative proper names (LaLa Land, Barack Hussein Obama), approbatives (“publicservant”, “free enterprise”), etc. The set of all these terms can be called “Prejudicals”.In addition to explaining the characterizing features usually associated to slurs,the account in terms of metadata knowledge also explains some unexplored features,such as the variation in tone and strength among the different slurs for the sametarget group and the role of slurs in shaping the social identity of their users (notjust the effects they produce on their victims), all with no need of additional linguisticmechanisms.
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